Ukraine launched Kursk incursion without West’s guidance, and ‘look how well it worked,’ says ex-NATO commander in Europe

Editor’s Note: This interview has been edited for clarity.
Even as Ukraine’s daring incursion into Russian territory brought the full-scale war back to the headlines around the world, Moscow’s forces keep grinding on the eastern front, with dire implications for the entire Donbas region.
Though Kyiv’s operation achieved an undeniable tactical success, the strategic calculus behind it remains unclear. Russia not only keeps up its pressure on Ukrainian forces but also continues to occupy roughly a fifth of Ukraine’s sovereign territory, with no clear pathway toward its liberation in sight.
The Kyiv Independent sat down with retired U.S. Air Force General Philip M. Breedlove, the former NATO Supreme Commander in Europe, at the Globsec forum in Prague on Sept. 1 to get his assessment of the battlefield situation at Kursk, Pokrovsk, and the war at large.
Drawing on his experience as the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) between 2013 and 2016, General Breedlove explains NATO’s past follies regarding Russian expansionism and warns against repeating these mistakes.
As a retired Air Force officer who knows the F-16 cockpit well, he also reveals that NATO knew Ukraine needed Western fighter jets from the very start of Russian aggression 10 years ago.
The Kyiv Independent: General, let’s start with the main topic of the past few weeks: Ukraine’s incursion into Kursk. How would you evaluate it both in terms of its tactical accomplishments and strategic implications for the war?
Philip M. Breedlove: Let’s start with tactical. I think it’s a complete success… a bold decision. Because, as you know, we have other things going on in Donbas. I think that (the incursion) has accomplished some very good strategic objectives in how it’s affecting the mental calculus of Russians and so forth.
I don’t want to get too technical, but some of the things that the Ukrainians have done in this effort, the way they have married electronic warfare (EW) to drone capabilities, the first-person-view (FPV) kind of capabilities, is quite good.
And they have used this combination of EW and the specific type of drones to (create) a bubble where they can not only protect their troops, but they can project power onto the Russian troops in a really intelligent, new-thinking kind of way.
And I congratulate this, I think it’s going to be one of those important lessons learned.
I think that we can all tell from what we see in the press and the reactions of the world – and to the degree that we know what’s going on in Russia – that it has been a tactical success.
The last time Russia was invaded was an awful long time ago. And this is not just some excursion that goes in and comes back out – it has staying power. I think that’s going to present a real problem for Mr. (Vladimir) Putin and his leadership in both military and internal ways in how the Russian people see their leadership and Ukraine’s ability to invade.
I think it’s too young yet to say that it is a great strategic success. I believe it is, but I think we need to watch it a little more and inform more permanent judgments.
The Kyiv Independent: You touched upon Donbas, where Russians keep advancing toward Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub. Are you worried that Ukraine deploying experienced brigades in Kursk Oblast may undermine Ukraine’s defense around Pokrovsk?
Philip M. Breedlove: So let’s both agree and accept that the Russians are making incremental gains towards Pokrovsk. While the push to Pokrovsk is important, there are other signals of (Russia’s) weakening capability. I have heard that the Russian military was given a directive to take Pokrovsk by September. They have failed again to accomplish that objective.
And in a larger sense, in any conflict, the leadership of a country – and we in the West believe in the loyalty of the military to the civilian leadership – has to make tough decisions. I call it ruthless prioritization.
History will tell us, but clearly, the leadership in Ukraine has decided that it is important to make this advance into Kursk. And sometimes, that comes with a little risk. No operation is without risk.
I think that history will record this as a good decision.
The Kyiv Independent: Some say that the war in Ukraine, specifically on the eastern front, has devolved into a sort of war of attrition. How can Ukraine win in such a conflict if it doesn’t have the same manpower, ammunition, and resources that Russia has?
Philip M. Breedlove: I think this is an amazing question, and I kind of hoped you would ask it because I think we can draw a contrast.
In the other portions of Donbas, Russia dictated the terms of the fight. And because Russia is unable to truly use its air force to support its ground troops, and because Russia has proven unable to do what we call classical maneuver warfare, it has settled into this linear defense attritional World War I-style of war. And Ukraine has had to respond to that.
But now, in this Kursk incursion, Ukraine has shown classic new-age maneuver warfare and what it can accomplish. And this whole idea of this bubble of electronic warfare, FPV drones, and other capabilities to move forward with their troops and to perform some of the things that classical airpower used to do… this is an incredible new way to fight.
I think that classical airpower would make it even better, but the fact of the matter is Ukraine dictated the terms of this fight, whereas Russia dictated that attritional, linear, World War I-style fight.
And Ukraine has demonstrated a real ability for maneuver warfare.
The Kyiv Independent: Whatever the results of the fighting in Kursk or Pokrovsk may be, the fact remains that Russia continues occupying roughly one-fifth of Ukraine’s territory, while last year’s counteroffensive that was supposed to liberate the territory largely failed…
Philip M. Breedlove: I don’t like that word. I think the West and others put a lot of limits on Ukraine. Ukraine had to fight on terms of the Russian style of fighting.  This (Kursk) incursion was taken without a lot of guidance from the West, and look how well it worked. I believe if Ukraine had been able to use that kind of initiative last year, we would have had a different result.
So I never use the words you just used, that last year’s counteroffensive “failed.” I think it is a misjudgment of Ukraine’s capability.
I’m going to say something I’ve said many times, and some people don’t like it. I believe this war will end exactly how Western policymakers want it to end. Right now, Western policymakers are unable to morally or intellectually understand what a Ukrainian win would mean. Putin defeated, Russia’s military defeated.
Putin has convinced the West that if that happens, there will be immense consequences. The most successful weapon that Putin has in this war is intimidation or, in military parlance, his ability to restrict Western actions by his threats.
If Ukraine is able to strike Russian equipment supply and personnel before they get to Ukraine, I think Ukraine can win this war. If we can get Western policymakers to allow Ukraine to fight like we allow Russia to fight from the sanctuary that we allow it to have, if we change those dynamics, Ukraine can win this war.
The Kyiv Independent: I want to ask you one question specifically because you are from the Air Force, you were an F-16 pilot. The lack of F-16s or comparable Western fighter jets was often cited as one of the key things that restricted the counteroffensive of 2023. Do you think that now, when Ukraine finally has the F-16s, they can still become a decisive factor in liberating Ukraine’s territory? Or did Russia already get too much time to adapt?
Philip M. Breedlove: See, I think that this is not one of the encouraging points. The F-16s are coming on so slowly because we have to train pilots. We have only a certain amount of F-16s that are being introduced gradually.
The F-16s will have an impact on today’s fight, but they will not have the same impact they would have if we had started (supplying) F-16s five years ago or six years ago. Now (Ukraine would have) a larger, mature force of F-16s that would have a dramatic impact on today’s fight.
Rather, what’s happening now is that this capability and impact is going to grow slowly and gradually over time. And sadly, it’s not going to have a huge decisive impact – in my opinion – in the next couple of months, maybe even six months.
But as (Ukraine) begins from there out to have more numbers of pilots and airplanes, the F-16s will have a large impact on the fight. And it would have had (that) impact last year.
By the way, everybody talks about how “they’ve been yelling for F-16s for a year and a half.” No, that’s wrong too.
We identified, over 10 years ago, that Ukraine needed fourth-generation fighters. We didn’t identify what kind – that would have been inappropriate – but what we needed to do over 10 years ago… (was) looking at how to help Ukraine’s military be more “Western.”
We identified these needs over 10 years ago, and the world has reacted extremely slowly to supply them.
The Kyiv Independent: You were in office as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) when the occupation of Crimea happened; when the war in Donbas started. What was the reaction, and what lessons did NATO take from this aggression?  
Philip M. Breedlove: The good lessons were at the beginning of the Wales conference (in 2014), which happened while I was SACEUR. We started making big changes to NATO readiness.
During the “peace dividend years,” the years after the (Berlin) Wall fell, we were all downsizing our militaries and letting our readiness slip. Our forces weren’t exercising (and) flying as much as they needed.
So we had settled into a place where we were trying to make at least a partner out of Russia.  Then Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, and even then, we sort of said, “Oh, that’s an aberration, it’s only a moment in time, we’ll get back to having peace with Russia.”
We kept limiting our ability to fight, and the military became more of a peacetime machine.
The good news is (that) since 2014, starting with the Wales conference and every summit thereafter, we have truly increased the readiness of NATO. We’ve increased the force sizes and structures in Europe, and we are making ourselves much more ready to fight.
The Kyiv Independent: So you think that by now, the European NATO is ready for a confrontation with an actor like Russia?
Philip M. Breedlove: No, but we’re way more ready than we were in 2014.
We have a way to go… Russia has demonstrated that it will amass an army, march across an internationally recognized border, and invade its neighbor (as it did) three times: in 2008, 2014, and 2.5 years ago.
We are now focused on current readiness, exercises, equipment, supplies, fixing things mechanically, and getting what we own ready to fight. (The tough part ahead is that) now, we have to make the decision of how much money we spend on that and how much we spend on future readiness.
Are we ready to fight in five years or 10 years? That’s a tough decision for lawmakers to make, but that’s where we are today.
The Kyiv Independent: Looking from the other perspective, Russia has lost considerable capability in Ukraine, manpower, equipment… How soon do you think Russia would be ready to confront an adversary like NATO?
Philip M. Breedlove: It depends on how we conduct the rest of this conflict.
If we now capitulate and reward bad behavior for a third time by giving Russia a bigger piece of Ukraine… then Russia can immediately begin to get ready for the next fight. And there will be a next fight.
We rewarded bad behavior in 2008, we let (Russia) hold on to 20% of Georgia. We rewarded bad behavior in 2014 by allowing Russia to hold on to about 12-13% of the most important commercial parts of Ukraine. And now, we’re talking about… capitulating yet again and rewarding bad behavior a third time by giving (Russia) more Ukrainian land.
If we do that, bad behavior is rewarded, and there will be more bad behavior. Keeping the pressure on means they have less ability to prepare for the next bad behavior. And I will say again, there will be one.
The Kyiv Independent: What key military lessons can NATO learn from Russia’s war against Ukraine?
Philip M. Breedlove: May I answer a little different question? Because I think there are lessons we do not want to learn  and there are lessons we do want to learn.  
Some of the innovative ways (Ukraine) has developed in drone warfare, incredible electronic warfare capabilities, these are the lessons we absolutely want to learn.
But partially, we’re learning these things because traditional ways of fighting have failed. The Ukrainian Air Force has done a magnificent job with what they have, but they have not been able to establish battlefield air superiority, nor air superiority over their whole country, which is a Western way of war.
We (the West) do create air superiority. And so we want to remember that while drone warfare is a necessary way of doing this when your traditional air capabilities fail, they’re going to work a whole lot better if the air forces… are able to establish air superiority.
I heard someone from Ukraine recently say they’re going to buy over 1.6 million drones next year, and they would expect to lose half of those drones – 800,000 – in the war.
If you have air superiority, you’re not going to lose 800,000. You may not have to buy 1.6 million because your drones will be able to act very differently in a zone where you own the sky.
And so we want to learn the lessons of EW, drone warfare, and other things that Ukraine does so well. But we don’t want to accept that those are a replacement for the ability of the nation to own the airspace.
Hi, this is Martin Fornusek. I hope you enjoyed this interview.
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